TL;DR: Citadel doesn't just have a major outsized influence in the US stock market via its market making firm/hedge fund, but also a major indirect influence via Headlands (biggest municipal bond trading firm made of 3 ex-Citadel employees), and direct influence on sovereign debt (can decide when sovereign credit default swaps pay out) with its seat on the CDDC (Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee).
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Hi y’all. Been some while since have been able to post regularly here, so I’m returning alongside my recent post on FHLB with a bit of a “DD". Partial rush job, so all errors are mine and mine alone (obviously)
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0. Sphere of Influence

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Over the past 84 years (/s), you lovely apes at Superstonk have been able to fish out many of the finer points of corruption crystallized into pure, unadulterated financial terrorism and financial terrorist-level crime undertaken by Steve Cohen (Point 72), Jeff Yass (Susquehanna), Doug Cifu & Vincent Viola (Virtu), as well as Wolverine Trading, Jane Street, TwoSigma, and more. But, of course, much of it has centered on our Mayo-artist-in-residence and his firm, that of none other but Ken Griffin and Citadel.
One of the biggest finds that has come to light has been the complete and utter bullshit of having (1) a hedge fund and (2) owning a market making firm that most DEFINITELY does not use that non-public information to its benefit? I mean, it would be easy for us to check except that we need 5 swipes to even access that level of inner sanctum at Citadel, which–per DLauer’s words–is more than the fucking Pentagon.
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But despite Ken Griffin’s reach into every aspect of the most influential stock market in the world, that is not his ONLY level of his sphere of influence. For we, dear apes, can step back and revisit this idea that Citadel’s power duo (its market making firm and hedge fund) is more like a single part of a Big 3.

1. Meet the Big 3

Citadel’s sphere of influence includes not JUST (1) the stock market business, but directly or indirectly, the (2) U.S. municipal and bond markets, plus (3) the sovereign debt/sovereign debt credit default swap markets.
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Yes, you heard that right. Citadel not only has some sufficient level of influence to tank your favorite stock–and, in turn–retirement fund, but can also effectively drive your city into the fucking ground, or even your country.
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I’ve written about each of these at length, and wanted to revisit some pieces in the wake of our recent dick twitchings of the coming financial crash.
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2. Meet the Municipal Bond Market

Citadel has an indirect grip tickling the taint of the municipal bond market, believe it or not. I first wrote about the municipal bond market here (“Headlands: How ex-Mayo mercenaries copy pasted Citadel’s model in the muni bond market”): https://www.reddit.com/Superstonk/comments/sy6ubj/headlands_how_exmayo_mercenaries_copy_pasted/. For those unfamiliar with municipal bonds, I’ll reiterate what they are and why many push them as a safe investment in most times (with some caution being thrown intermittently due to the collapse of regional banks like FRC and Silicon Valley Bank):
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https://preview.redd.it/e8bqxn3wk5pa1.png?width=1326&format=png&auto=webp&s=cc1e3c44bced207ca23105ae48110eb7298441f1
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“Municipal bonds (or "munis" for short) help towns/cities raise money for projects like building schools, parks, and fixing highways. Many retail investors--admittedly, on the wealthier side--invest in munis for tax incentives like not paying federal tax on bond returns. In certain cases, certain muni buys also mean no state taxes are paid…Just like what had happened to stocks, the old-school market for buying and selling muni bonds is going electronic. This is mainly done through an ATS, or "alternative trading system" known also as a dark pool. This speeds up the process of buying and selling munis, making it closer to a "house auction".

In the wake of the SVB (Silicon Valley Bank), there have already been rumblings of its effect on the municipal bond market (Bloomberg “Bank Woes Create Bond Bargain in Obscure Corner of Muni Market”):
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“Investor concerns over the crises within the financial industry are bleeding into a corner of the $4 trillion municipal-bond market where major investment banks guarantee energy for public utilities….
Spreads have widened on so-called prepaid gas bonds, which government agencies use to purchase long-term supplies of natural gas. Large institutional banks act as facilitators of the transactions, guaranteeing the supply and providing investors tax-exempt exposure to bank credit….

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3. San Jose, Revisited

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That part about “large institutional banks” acting as facilitators of the transactions is what we saw in part in this post by [redacted].
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https://preview.redd.it/5pp1500xi5pa1.png?width=1128&format=png&auto=webp&s=b4f48ce1f6d11fff15d44cc47b2174882e34eb03
A commenter spoke about this, and how it wasn’t Wells Fargo in doo doo but the city of San Jose.
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“I believe in theses cases it’s not Wells Fargo that has a problem but the city of San José.

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„Because presentments are currently processed automatically at DTC, IPAs have the option to refuse to pay (“RTP”) for maturing MMI Obligations to protect against the possibility that an IPA may not be able to fund settlement because it has not received funds from the relevant issuer. „ -> Wells Fargo didn’t receive the money from San José city.
Wells Fargo acts as an issuing agent for the city - the city transfers assets to the trustee and the trustee securitizes the assets and offers the money market securities to investors. The assets generate money (for example a sports arena that was build) and that money goes through the city of San José to the trustee who is managed by Wells Fargo.

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https://preview.redd.it/nc8lbgwsk5pa1.png?width=1280&format=png&auto=webp&s=35e2c386534eb904608db679a9954affe0338c9a

Wells Fargo has no liability or influence on the money that comes from the city and is distributed to the investors. If the money doesn’t come or isn’t sufficient, the assets are sold or liquidated and used to pay investors.
Anyway: Wells Fargo acts on behalf of the city and is not responsible they just handle securitization but don’t have any influence on payments or failure/default.”

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In this case, we might be seeing one of the first of MANY issues of cities up shit’s creek over this.
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4. The Municipal Bond Market Time Bomb

The size of the municipal market is A SHIT TON BIGGER than the corporate bond market, which will already show even more signs of being turbo fucked due to borrowing at low interest rates for years. Here’s the size of the municipal bond market for scale, sans banana:
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https://preview.redd.it/9pcmm2c9j5pa1.png?width=760&format=png&auto=webp&s=869c0863c6ecc788c29d6dbe37da76521a700d1e
Unfortunately, just like retirement funds, many muni investors are “buy and hold”: they buy a muni expecting a safe, long-term return with no federal income tax and then, welp, shit hits the fan. The market is heavily illiquid too, meaning if shit needs to move, then you might be fucked. Only about 1% of municipal securities trade any given day, in auctions that often take HOURS:
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“Now, the primary method of trading on this doesn't look like the New York Stock Exchange or like Nasdaq. It looks like an auction. It takes about 4 hours. An auction is initiated. Participants who come in can bid on this, and it is a competitive auction that yields a very good price.”

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Now to my understanding you can’t short these bonds, but the long time frame means its hard to sell these illiquid assets. Not only that, THERE IS NO NATIONAL NBBO (National Best Bid Offer)...you’re flying blind while this shit happens.
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Now if you’re wondering what magnanimous souls are helping municipal bonds be sold or fixed in a timely manner for cities like San Jose, well have I got news for you.
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5. Meet Headlands, U.S. Municipal/Bond Market Making Firm…Run by 3 Ex-Citadel Employees

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Two months after the sneeze (March 2021), TD Ameritrade bought municipal bond market maker Headlands. Yes, that’s right…an electronic market maker just like Citadel, this time for bonds for cities and towns vs. stocks. Now let’s check the fine fellows that run this:
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https://preview.redd.it/i1jnj88bj5pa1.png?width=1886&format=png&auto=webp&s=a6ea375e929a247f0b9618fed703ef519561a6a2

• Jason Lehman: Citadel Investment Group, began/ran their global options market making, dipped his dick in Japanese convertible bonds, and managed “Private Investments”
• Neil Fitzpatrick: Citadel Execution Services COO (Citadel Investment affiliate), ran equities/options. Ex-Knight Capital Group, did Citadel’s OTC and equity shit. Direct Edge board of directors.
• Matthew Andresen, co-CEO Citadel Derivatives (Citadel Investment affiliate). Previously served on board of directors/committees in the past from International Securities Exchange, Direct Edge, CFTC, Lava Trading (Citi’s electronic trading unit that made LavaFlow)

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Of note, Matthew Andresen founded Island, one of the 1st dark pools EVER and 2nd only to “Instinet” (who also got an even bigger wave of funds during the sneeze, info courtesy of Ringing Bells) and was featured heavily in the Scott Patterson book “Dark Pools”.
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Ol Matty told us that Headlands is completely automated, and where some muni traders make 75-100 muni bond sales a day (sometimes over the phone), Headlands currently bids on 10,000+ bond auctions a day with its algo. Matty Boi even said if that number ever 10x’d “we wouldn’t notice.” Even more sus, Headlands has been growing its own “holdings” of muni bonds on its books.
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6. In Bros We Trust

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So remember, this branch of 3 ex-Citadel bros is front and center to the issues already rearing their head. In my previous post, these were just SOME of the already teetering municipal bond issues:
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• Some might have history befall them again: last time the market crashed, Michael Burry’s California went spiraling down to BBB rated for many municipal bonds. California is a special muni case where it generally does well when times are good; much of their revenue is tied to personal income taxes. But when shit goes tits up, it goes tits up.
• Major projects have tons of debt piling up due to the [March 2020 crash] New Jersey built a giant ass mall–I kid you not--called “The American Dream” over 10+ years that has no sales receipts to cover it in part due to the dropoff in retail buying. As of 2 weeks ago, the mall only had like less than $1000 in the bank to pay off muni debt (“Developer Triple Five Group also sold US$800 million of muni-debt backed by payments they agreed to make to bondholders instead of paying property taxes”)...

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https://preview.redd.it/s8wqbdtej5pa1.png?width=1217&format=png&auto=webp&s=d2ee309462354293b1a4907d0966889bd841089f

• NYC’s MTA has been getting reamed by both ends. One of the biggest shitstains on its books is that it took out a shit ton of municipal debt and opted to sell $3 billion in bonds to the Fed’s muni lending program to stay afloat

And this issues extends way beyond the U.S.' 50 states...it even affects our territories too.
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7. Hurricane

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What began this rabbit hole was the one and only welp 0 0 7, who caught wind of some fuckery in the municipal bond market:
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In the post, he mentioned how "American Thinker" 's Joseph Lawler mentioned the SEC has been giving fucking STIFF Heismans nonstop (or per [redacted] the ol' Dustin Martin "don't argues" for you Aussie apes!) on FOIA requests (Freedom of Information Act) related to the municipal bond default in Puerto Rico, the BIGGEST bond default in America's history EVER.
It went all the way the way up to a federal court in California where the SEC said "we don't know what you're talking about" when others found they have fucking 2800 pages of documents on it and nearly 270,000(!) emails referencing it referencing a billion dollar Ponzi scheme on the level of fucking Bernie Madoff.
Big banks (Citi, Wells Fargo, BoFa) had their scheme collapse in 2016, potentially bribed senators to kill investigations into it by the DOJ and now the SEC is caught in yet ANOTHER 2 lawsuits saying they fucking aided and abetted this shit.

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You see, because this level of municipal bond includes fuckery includes not just cities and towns, but U.S. TERRITORIES. In my post about Hurricane Maria’s effect on Puerto Rico, I talked about how UBS and others loaded up Puerto Rico with debt because of what’s called a “Treasury Put” guarantee that was even called “an exit strategy” for banks (“They describe the "treasury put" as "...the implicit guarantee -- as perceived by investors -- from a government agency to provide support in the event of financial distress by the issuer of Puerto Rican bonds."”).
Puerto Rico’s default was the largest in US history, EVER. And all this the same while guess who was holding the bag? Let’s see what W S O P tells us:
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“The reality is that a large percentage of Puerto Rico’s debt is held in tax-free municipal bonds and municipal bond mutual funds, owned not by Wall Street banks or tycoons, but by mom and pop investors seeking tax-free income.”

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So once again, whether its retirement funds or municipal bonds, its retail caught holding the bag. And this hasn't changed for years. We’ve seen similar fuckery with bonds for NYC in the 70s, and more recently in the 00s for Detroit.
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One astute wrinkle by the name of [redacted] posted this on that original post trying to dig into how it could all be related:
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…how the MMLF fund that expanded money/credit to towns/cities started including commercial paper…but also leveraged near the 15 to 1 ratio perhaps under the Net Capital Requirement limit:
[redacted said]: "$500B at 14:1 Leverage? If I'm making the right connection between the flavor of asset, that's just under the 15x Net Capital Requirement limit. Is this all the Fed had/could afford? Or is this all they needed at the time?

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8. Don't Bet Against America...Says the Banks and Hedge Funds That Already Did

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Commercial Paper? Municipals related? Now where does that sound familiar? Ah, yes…the city of San Jose got its call-out by Wells Fargo over COMMERCIAL PAPER. This comes as the push for ppl into municipal bond markets continues, trying to sell it as a “safe haven” to retail investors. Vanguard just recently launched its first ETF–surprise, its first US-listed ETF in 2 years– for municipal bonds (selling point: “hey everyone it’s tax-exempt! Give us money plz!”) for example:
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Many of us can see all of it for what it is. Bullshit. In the wake of the SVB collapse, there is still a strong push that these regional banks–many of which lend to municipalities–will be fine. This “safe haven” theory continues, even as articles try to have them appeal abroad (such as a few days ago, “ ESG Factors of Munis May Attract Non-US Investors” “https://www.marketsmedia.com/esg-factors-of-munis-may-attract-non-us-investors/”)
Even further, one last find is that . I mean it’s not like credit default swaps can be taken on cities and towns in theory right?
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FWIW also I found an interesting research paper talking about hedge funds buying up credit default swaps, and how they could potentially bankrupt towns/municipalities through some of these moves if they wanted: https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/8264/MingJieWangCreditDefaultS.pdf?sequence=2
"Another potential concern is that even in a market that is generally liquid, the market for individual single-name [Credit default swap]s may be quite small, which could allow a single bad actor (a hedge fund, for example) to force a municipality into default..."

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This is all while we have 3 ex-Citadel heads in charge of just how the municipal bond market moves, like that of San Jose.
So is this where Citadel’s reach stops? Clearly, no. It doesn’t stop at the US border, just like how Mayo Force One doesn’t.

10. ELI5: What’s a Soverign Credit Default Swap?

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That’s right, mofos. You read that sub-header right. In case you’re wondering, not only can you take out credit default swaps on a failing Swiss bank like CS, but you can do so ON ENTIRE FUCKING COUNTRIES.
In one of my old posts “Sovereign Debts & Ransom Notes: Pt. 1 The Importance of Being Non-Linearly Destabilized through Sovereign Credit Default Swaps”
(“https://www.reddit.com/Superstonk/comments/t35rdi/sovereign_debts_ransom_notes_pt_1_the_importance/”), I talked a little more about the insanity of these things even existing.
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Sovereign credit default swaps exist. Long story short: sovereign credit default swaps are insurance policies that if a country defaults (usually on its debt)then you get paid! Like many other shit that we’ve seen in the GME saga, they are a form of financial derivative (a bet that something goes up, a bet that something goes down) on an underlying (the thing you’re betting on)....They can be used to insure government debt for a country in case that country is unable to pay its debt, for example. However, just like other instruments, naked sovereign credit default swaps also exist.

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Naked sovereign credit default swaps are used to bet that a country or a country's debt will fail without you owning that country's debt. In part, they were destabilising during the Euro-crisis immediately after the 2008 financial crash. Greece was one of the countries that got naked shorted in 2008. In fact, the country got shorted so bad they were worried about fucking SHORT SQUEEZES on Greek debt and the sovereign CDSs!
In 2012, the EU put a ban on naked sovereign credit default swaps. However, workarounds include the fact that a country can effectively change its mind on it within 24 hours and all the regulatory agency can do is offer an opinion.

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There were a tons of perhaps “we will see soon” if relevant additional points in that old research, including:
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• The VIX affects sovereign credit default swaps A LOT

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• The Big Bang Protocol: ISDA helped formulate a set of rules that decides when a country “defaults”
• You can “short” a sovereign bond if you find a locate (sound familiar?: “Short sales of shares and short sales of sovereign debt will be permitted only where the seller has “located” the share or debt instrument prior to entering into the agreement and has a “reasonable expectation” of being able to borrow the shares.”)

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Crazy shit. So you might say, now this post is meant to be about Citadel’s sphere of influence you might say? “Where does Citadel fit into all this? ”

11. Meet the CDDC (Credit Derivatives Determination Committee)...Where Citadel Sit and Helps Decide Which Countries Default on their Debt

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One of the biggest GFC 2008 scenarios of sovereign credit default swaps being misused was against Greece. Afterwards, one of its biggest cases of misuse was by Elliot Management (ran by Paul Singer) who was using their position on the Credit Derivatives Determination Committee, or CDDC, to help decide when their sovereign credit default swaps against Argentina would pay out.
Wait, Eliot Management doesn’t sound big enough. Who else is on this committee?
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Oh wait, so Citadel is ALSO on this committee? Alongside our favorite fucksticks like Chase, Goldman, Deutsche, and BNP?
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It’s not lost on me with seeing now that Credit Suisse has been sucked up into UBS, maybe its position on the CDDC has been absorbed further by UBS. Back then, I wrote about the fact is we know next to nothing about the sovereign credit default swaps that might be opened up against countries (be it Russia, Sri Lanka, or otherwise):
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https://preview.redd.it/t3kx1tk2l5pa1.png?width=850&format=png&auto=webp&s=f829d1a1c14d4df74fe7a2ad7d832d1409662e76

Here's one such example of a swap dealer: Swiss financial terrorist aficionados UBS AG, who registered to be a swaps dealer with the US at the end of 2012. (UBS had also been a member of the CDDC through the Greek crisis in early 2012, alongside Citadel. In Mar. 2012, they were also one of the members pressing to ask whether Greece had defaulted already.)
UBS AG registered as a swap dealer in the US at the end of 2012 enabling the continuation of swaps business with US persons. Regulations issued by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) impose substantial new requirements on registered swap dealers for clearing, trade execution, transaction reporting, recordkeeping, risk management and business conduct.
If UBS AG decides to make a market on sovereign credit default swaps like Russia, then we might also have no idea who is on the other side of the trade. This also goes for many of the other swap dealers who (surprise surprise) also sit on the CDDC board and can determine just when these sovereign credit default swaps pay out.

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Not only that, but the CDDC even can say when CORPORATE BONDS even shit the bed: late last year, they were the ones who were deciding to let everyone know whether Sunac (an Evergrande-relate company) went tits up.

12. We Say When

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For months, there has been talk of a looming debt crisis (alongside all the other ones) in the sovereign debt world.
And shit continues to hit the proverbial fan. Apart from Russia, Sri Lanka and others, emerging markets like Ghana and Zambia are beginning to feel the hits from their sovereign debt (oftentimes, trying to restructure it with creditors like China).
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Even further, now that Credit Suisse has gone under. We may have another thing to worry about: what banks and prime brokers are housing these opaque sovereign debt structures, loans, and swaps? Even worse, what happens when they go under? Roll that less than beautiful bean footage:
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https://preview.redd.it/wt5v7uu0j5pa1.png?width=1134&format=png&auto=webp&s=df9cf3379be7ce881d7704013f4e6d92e287f08c
https://www.livemint.com/news/world/before-collapse-credit-suisse-quietly-conquered-an-obscure-debt-market-11679395660932.html
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“Before collapse, Credit Suisse quietly conquered an obscure debt market
Before its rescue by Swiss rival UBS, Credit Suisse had quietly become a major player in an obscure market that purports to help developing countries ease their debt burdens in exchange for protecting nature. Known as debt-for-nature swaps, the complex financial instruments help governments restructure their debt to raise money that can be used to fund conservation efforts.

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Credit Suisse was the sole structurer and arranger of the world’s largest debt-for-nature swap, a $364 million deal that it orchestrated in 2021 along with The Nature Conservancy, a charity, for Belize. Last year, it sealed another $150 million deal for Barbados. Credit Suisse has in recent years helped revive interest in the instruments and for the first time opened them up to institutional capital. The bank raised money for Belize and Barbados from pension funds including Sweden’s Alecta and Nuveen LLC, a unit of the US’s TIAA, by issuing so-called blue bonds tied to the deals.

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he convoluted setup has drawn criticism from sovereign debt experts for its high cost and lack of transparency. And the opaque terms of the Belize and Barbados deals — the first of their kind — mean outside analysts will struggle to assess precisely what comes next.

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A lot of poorer, especially emerging market countries were already in dire straits. Now as opaque deals meant to help these countries might not come to light (are these some of the Level 3 assets that UBS was talking about?), we can ask ourselves wtf will happen when the same banks looking to save their own ass while holding these sovereign, are the same fuckers that sit on the same board that can decide when they are worthless (while I’m sure being positioned net short).
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All in all, these banks and holders of sovereign debt credit default swaps, who decide when a country goes boom, are sitting arm in arm alongside Citadel, who themselves potentially hover their greasy mayo-covered finger over the button that decides just when and how the US stock market will eventually implode.
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13. Everything Everywhere All at Once

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To recap, we then have Citadel with (1) the biggest market maker and arguably one of the most influential hedge fund able to decide which stocks rise and which fall as the US stock market teeters on the brink of collapse…
…with having (2) three of its ex-employees in charge of (not even counting other Citadel employees working there) operating at Headlands ready to help position themselves when the municipal bond market gets nuked, whether as a continued result of regional bank failure or in spite of it…
…while (3) sitting on the board that determines when ENTIRE COUNTRIES FAIL, in such a way that their hedge fund and associated pals can be ready to short and profit off failing nations that they and their fuckstick friends help cause.
Did I miss anything? Because remember, Citadel is not just Citadel, the market-maker that we all love to hate; Citadel’s sphere of influence via the Big 3 means the grip that it holds over the US and world economy is even greater than we think…and as such, far far more dangerous.

St. Albert, Alberta--(Newsfile Corp. - March 20, 2023) - Enterprise Group, Inc. (TSX: E) (OTCQB: ETOLF) (the "Company" or "Enterprise"). Enterprise, a consolidator of energy services (including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector), is pleased to announce its Q4 2022 and FY2022 results.
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https://preview.redd.it/sa8b3lf3z4pa1.png?width=266&format=png&auto=webp&s=de6dcdd0c4a3c0bc4f437326c2e2c3b993f173d8
OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
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https://preview.redd.it/h70yxpn4z4pa1.jpg?width=1427&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=f7a2dd9aafb2e69393c79fe41c23847cbd369c51
(1) Identified and defined under "Non-IFRS Measures". (2) The Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ended in October 2021. To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and adjusted EBITDA to reflect the results of operations without any subsidy programs.

• The 2022 year has been one of the strongest in recent history. Higher capital spending in the energy industry combined with increased customer activity levels in has resulted in improved results. During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier one clients which contributed to the improved operating results. Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $26,892,249 compared to $18,732,335 in the prior period, an increase of $8,159,914 or 44%. Adjusted gross margin for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $10,879,928 compared to $4,982,731 in the prior period, an increase of $5,897,197 or 118%. Adjusted EBITDA for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $8,147,223 compared to $2,959,020 in the prior period, an increase of $5,188,203 or 175%. Revenue for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $8,734,471 compared to $5,730,978 in the prior period, an increase of $3,003,493 or 52%. Adjusted gross margin for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $4,157,875 compared to $2,091,874 in the prior period, an increase of $2,066,001 or 99%. Adjusted EBITDA for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $3,283,612 compared to adjusted EBITDA of $1,547,549 in the prior period, an increase of $1,736,063 or 112%. Increases in gross margin and EBITDA for the year and the quarter are reflective of increases customer activity in 2022 while maintaining the overall cost structure of the Company.
• For the year ended December 31, 2022, the company generated cash flow from operations of $5,910,830 compared to $3,500,869 in the prior year. This change is consistent with the higher activity during the year. The Company continues to utilize a combination of cash flow and debt to right-size and modernize its equipment fleet to meet customer demands. During the year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased $5,569,011 of capital assets primarily for natural gas power generation, upgrading the energy efficiency of existing equipment and meeting specific requests from customers. During this same period, the Company also sold property, plant and equipment and received proceeds $1,216,724 of which were re-invested in new equipment.
• During year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased and cancelled 1,799,000 shares at a cost of $714,614, or $0.40 per share. These shares had a carrying value of $1.36 per share for a total of $2,445,077 which has been removed from the share capital account. Since the initiation of the share buyback program, the Company has purchased and cancelled 10,057,500 shares at a cost of $2,391,560 or $0.24 per share. These shares have a carrying value of $1.42 per share for a total of $14,289,151 which has been removed from the share capital account over the entire share buyback program. In addition to the share buyback program, during year ended December 31, 2022, management exercised 4,881,000 options resulting in net proceeds of $901,070 being reinvested into the Company, creating a management ownership position of 40%. Enterprise has renewed its normal course issuer bid through to August 29, 2023. The Company believes its stock remains undervalued as the Company's book value is $0.68 per share. In addition, the Company has available tax losses of $0.17 per share and is in the process of developing a consolidated tax plan to utilize those losses. Management will continue to be aggressive in acquiring its shares.
• In April of this year, Enterprise Group officially launched a new wholly owned subsidiary, Evolution Power Projects, Inc. ("EPP"). EPP is the leading provider of low emission, mobile power systems and associated surface infrastructure to the Energy, Resource, and Industrial sectors. The Company's innovative methods are delivering to its client's low emission natural gas-powered systems and micro-grid technology, allowing clients to eliminate diesel entirely. A significant portion of Enterprise's capital expenditures for 2022 was for additional natural gas-powered systems, including turbine generators. EPP can now provide mobile micro-grid technology in the 1-megawatt range which has allowed EPP to expand its services into water pumping and drilling support, further eliminating the use of diesel power. Also, EPP's systems are equipped to deliver real-time emission metrics providing its clients the assurances necessary for them to accomplish their ESG reporting and objectives.
• In the prior year, the Company benefited from the Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ("CEWS" and "CERS") which ended in October 2021. To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and adjusted EBITDA to reflect the results without any subsidy programs. Utilizing the CEWS and CERS programs, the Company recorded $nil for the three months ended December 31, 2022 (2021 - $28,586) against direct costs and $nil (2021 - $31,624) against EBITDA. Utilizing the CEWS and CERS programs, the Company recorded $nil for the year ended December 31, 2022 (2021 - $1,649,087), against direct costs and $nil (2021 - $1,908,866) against EBITDA.
• After year end on January 23, 2023, the Company's common shares began trading on the OTCQB Venture Market under the ticker symbol ETOLF. In addition to the listing, Enterprise's shares are now eligible for electronic clearing and settlement with the Depository Trust Company for trading in the United States. This listing will help to increase Enterprise's visibility and accessibility to a growing audience of U.S. investors.

About Enterprise Group, Inc.
Enterprise Group, Inc is a consolidator of services-including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector. The Company works with particular emphasis on systems and technologies that mitigate, reduce, or eliminate CO2 and Greenhouse Gas emissions for itself and its clients. The Company is well known to local Tier One and international resource companies with operations in Western Canada. More information is available at the Company's website www.enterprisegrp.ca. Corporate filings can be found on www.sedar.com.
For questions or additional information, please contact:
Leonard Jaroszuk: President & CEO, or Desmond O'Kell: Senior Vice-President [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) 780-418-4400

St. Albert, Alberta--(Newsfile Corp. - March 20, 2023) - Enterprise Group, Inc. (TSX: E) (OTCQB: ETOLF) (the "Company" or "Enterprise"). Enterprise, a consolidator of energy services (including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector), is pleased to announce its Q4 2022 and FY2022 results.
​
https://preview.redd.it/p0i8lclty4pa1.png?width=266&format=png&auto=webp&s=5bdc2dd98ee2dfde2b775cb5d7bf19489e18584e
OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
​
https://preview.redd.it/0i48aaisy4pa1.jpg?width=1427&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=8308faf471486524d4bd8a4629e6720f8116a080
(1) Identified and defined under "Non-IFRS Measures". (2) The Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ended in October 2021. To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and adjusted EBITDA to reflect the results of operations without any subsidy programs.

• The 2022 year has been one of the strongest in recent history. Higher capital spending in the energy industry combined with increased customer activity levels in has resulted in improved results. During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier one clients which contributed to the improved operating results. Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $26,892,249 compared to $18,732,335 in the prior period, an increase of $8,159,914 or 44%. Adjusted gross margin for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $10,879,928 compared to $4,982,731 in the prior period, an increase of $5,897,197 or 118%. Adjusted EBITDA for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $8,147,223 compared to $2,959,020 in the prior period, an increase of $5,188,203 or 175%. Revenue for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $8,734,471 compared to $5,730,978 in the prior period, an increase of $3,003,493 or 52%. Adjusted gross margin for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $4,157,875 compared to $2,091,874 in the prior period, an increase of $2,066,001 or 99%. Adjusted EBITDA for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $3,283,612 compared to adjusted EBITDA of $1,547,549 in the prior period, an increase of $1,736,063 or 112%. Increases in gross margin and EBITDA for the year and the quarter are reflective of increases customer activity in 2022 while maintaining the overall cost structure of the Company.
• For the year ended December 31, 2022, the company generated cash flow from operations of $5,910,830 compared to $3,500,869 in the prior year. This change is consistent with the higher activity during the year. The Company continues to utilize a combination of cash flow and debt to right-size and modernize its equipment fleet to meet customer demands. During the year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased $5,569,011 of capital assets primarily for natural gas power generation, upgrading the energy efficiency of existing equipment and meeting specific requests from customers. During this same period, the Company also sold property, plant and equipment and received proceeds $1,216,724 of which were re-invested in new equipment.
• During year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased and cancelled 1,799,000 shares at a cost of $714,614, or $0.40 per share. These shares had a carrying value of $1.36 per share for a total of $2,445,077 which has been removed from the share capital account. Since the initiation of the share buyback program, the Company has purchased and cancelled 10,057,500 shares at a cost of $2,391,560 or $0.24 per share. These shares have a carrying value of $1.42 per share for a total of $14,289,151 which has been removed from the share capital account over the entire share buyback program. In addition to the share buyback program, during year ended December 31, 2022, management exercised 4,881,000 options resulting in net proceeds of $901,070 being reinvested into the Company, creating a management ownership position of 40%. Enterprise has renewed its normal course issuer bid through to August 29, 2023. The Company believes its stock remains undervalued as the Company's book value is $0.68 per share. In addition, the Company has available tax losses of $0.17 per share and is in the process of developing a consolidated tax plan to utilize those losses. Management will continue to be aggressive in acquiring its shares.
• In April of this year, Enterprise Group officially launched a new wholly owned subsidiary, Evolution Power Projects, Inc. ("EPP"). EPP is the leading provider of low emission, mobile power systems and associated surface infrastructure to the Energy, Resource, and Industrial sectors. The Company's innovative methods are delivering to its client's low emission natural gas-powered systems and micro-grid technology, allowing clients to eliminate diesel entirely. A significant portion of Enterprise's capital expenditures for 2022 was for additional natural gas-powered systems, including turbine generators. EPP can now provide mobile micro-grid technology in the 1-megawatt range which has allowed EPP to expand its services into water pumping and drilling support, further eliminating the use of diesel power. Also, EPP's systems are equipped to deliver real-time emission metrics providing its clients the assurances necessary for them to accomplish their ESG reporting and objectives.
• In the prior year, the Company benefited from the Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ("CEWS" and "CERS") which ended in October 2021. To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and adjusted EBITDA to reflect the results without any subsidy programs. Utilizing the CEWS and CERS programs, the Company recorded $nil for the three months ended December 31, 2022 (2021 - $28,586) against direct costs and $nil (2021 - $31,624) against EBITDA. Utilizing the CEWS and CERS programs, the Company recorded $nil for the year ended December 31, 2022 (2021 - $1,649,087), against direct costs and $nil (2021 - $1,908,866) against EBITDA.
• After year end on January 23, 2023, the Company's common shares began trading on the OTCQB Venture Market under the ticker symbol ETOLF. In addition to the listing, Enterprise's shares are now eligible for electronic clearing and settlement with the Depository Trust Company for trading in the United States. This listing will help to increase Enterprise's visibility and accessibility to a growing audience of U.S. investors.

About Enterprise Group, Inc.
Enterprise Group, Inc is a consolidator of services-including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector. The Company works with particular emphasis on systems and technologies that mitigate, reduce, or eliminate CO2 and Greenhouse Gas emissions for itself and its clients. The Company is well known to local Tier One and international resource companies with operations in Western Canada. More information is available at the Company's website www.enterprisegrp.ca. Corporate filings can be found on www.sedar.com.
For questions or additional information, please contact:
Leonard Jaroszuk: President & CEO, or Desmond O'Kell: Senior Vice-President [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) 780-418-4400

St. Albert, Alberta--(Newsfile Corp. - March 20, 2023) - Enterprise Group, Inc. (TSX: E) (OTCQB: ETOLF) (the "Company" or "Enterprise"). Enterprise, a consolidator of energy services (including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector), is pleased to announce its Q4 2022 and FY2022 results.
​
https://preview.redd.it/mn1of1hky4pa1.png?width=266&format=png&auto=webp&s=ca70496dee8c9ffd8f7759e455a3c2e0bb1e606a
OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
​
https://preview.redd.it/5uvsnmhmy4pa1.jpg?width=1427&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=855b1782e6f937781d21effc0859bdd900206b20
(1) Identified and defined under "Non-IFRS Measures". (2) The Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ended in October 2021. To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and adjusted EBITDA to reflect the results of operations without any subsidy programs.

• The 2022 year has been one of the strongest in recent history. Higher capital spending in the energy industry combined with increased customer activity levels in has resulted in improved results. During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier one clients which contributed to the improved operating results. Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $26,892,249 compared to $18,732,335 in the prior period, an increase of $8,159,914 or 44%. Adjusted gross margin for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $10,879,928 compared to $4,982,731 in the prior period, an increase of $5,897,197 or 118%. Adjusted EBITDA for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $8,147,223 compared to $2,959,020 in the prior period, an increase of $5,188,203 or 175%. Revenue for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $8,734,471 compared to $5,730,978 in the prior period, an increase of $3,003,493 or 52%. Adjusted gross margin for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $4,157,875 compared to $2,091,874 in the prior period, an increase of $2,066,001 or 99%. Adjusted EBITDA for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $3,283,612 compared to adjusted EBITDA of $1,547,549 in the prior period, an increase of $1,736,063 or 112%. Increases in gross margin and EBITDA for the year and the quarter are reflective of increases customer activity in 2022 while maintaining the overall cost structure of the Company.
• For the year ended December 31, 2022, the company generated cash flow from operations of $5,910,830 compared to $3,500,869 in the prior year. This change is consistent with the higher activity during the year. The Company continues to utilize a combination of cash flow and debt to right-size and modernize its equipment fleet to meet customer demands. During the year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased $5,569,011 of capital assets primarily for natural gas power generation, upgrading the energy efficiency of existing equipment and meeting specific requests from customers. During this same period, the Company also sold property, plant and equipment and received proceeds $1,216,724 of which were re-invested in new equipment.
• During year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased and cancelled 1,799,000 shares at a cost of $714,614, or $0.40 per share. These shares had a carrying value of $1.36 per share for a total of $2,445,077 which has been removed from the share capital account. Since the initiation of the share buyback program, the Company has purchased and cancelled 10,057,500 shares at a cost of $2,391,560 or $0.24 per share. These shares have a carrying value of $1.42 per share for a total of $14,289,151 which has been removed from the share capital account over the entire share buyback program. In addition to the share buyback program, during year ended December 31, 2022, management exercised 4,881,000 options resulting in net proceeds of $901,070 being reinvested into the Company, creating a management ownership position of 40%. Enterprise has renewed its normal course issuer bid through to August 29, 2023. The Company believes its stock remains undervalued as the Company's book value is $0.68 per share. In addition, the Company has available tax losses of $0.17 per share and is in the process of developing a consolidated tax plan to utilize those losses. Management will continue to be aggressive in acquiring its shares.
• In April of this year, Enterprise Group officially launched a new wholly owned subsidiary, Evolution Power Projects, Inc. ("EPP"). EPP is the leading provider of low emission, mobile power systems and associated surface infrastructure to the Energy, Resource, and Industrial sectors. The Company's innovative methods are delivering to its client's low emission natural gas-powered systems and micro-grid technology, allowing clients to eliminate diesel entirely. A significant portion of Enterprise's capital expenditures for 2022 was for additional natural gas-powered systems, including turbine generators. EPP can now provide mobile micro-grid technology in the 1-megawatt range which has allowed EPP to expand its services into water pumping and drilling support, further eliminating the use of diesel power. Also, EPP's systems are equipped to deliver real-time emission metrics providing its clients the assurances necessary for them to accomplish their ESG reporting and objectives.
• In the prior year, the Company benefited from the Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ("CEWS" and "CERS") which ended in October 2021. To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and adjusted EBITDA to reflect the results without any subsidy programs. Utilizing the CEWS and CERS programs, the Company recorded $nil for the three months ended December 31, 2022 (2021 - $28,586) against direct costs and $nil (2021 - $31,624) against EBITDA. Utilizing the CEWS and CERS programs, the Company recorded $nil for the year ended December 31, 2022 (2021 - $1,649,087), against direct costs and $nil (2021 - $1,908,866) against EBITDA.
• After year end on January 23, 2023, the Company's common shares began trading on the OTCQB Venture Market under the ticker symbol ETOLF. In addition to the listing, Enterprise's shares are now eligible for electronic clearing and settlement with the Depository Trust Company for trading in the United States. This listing will help to increase Enterprise's visibility and accessibility to a growing audience of U.S. investors.

About Enterprise Group, Inc.
Enterprise Group, Inc is a consolidator of services-including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector. The Company works with particular emphasis on systems and technologies that mitigate, reduce, or eliminate CO2 and Greenhouse Gas emissions for itself and its clients. The Company is well known to local Tier One and international resource companies with operations in Western Canada. More information is available at the Company's website www.enterprisegrp.ca. Corporate filings can be found on www.sedar.com.
For questions or additional information, please contact:
Leonard Jaroszuk: President & CEO, or Desmond O'Kell: Senior Vice-President [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) 780-418-4400

St. Albert, Alberta--(Newsfile Corp. - March 20, 2023) - Enterprise Group, Inc. (TSX: E) (OTCQB: ETOLF) (the "Company" or "Enterprise"). Enterprise, a consolidator of energy services (including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector), is pleased to announce its Q4 2022 and FY2022 results.
​
https://preview.redd.it/x73mibody4pa1.png?width=266&format=png&auto=webp&s=2a64480216909add3072f410f0e2c4d2765717fe
OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
​
https://preview.redd.it/r8on925hy4pa1.jpg?width=1427&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=8171174ca6b032c4853b83c320574f653949fb44
(1) Identified and defined under "Non-IFRS Measures". (2) The Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ended in October 2021. To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and adjusted EBITDA to reflect the results of operations without any subsidy programs.

• The 2022 year has been one of the strongest in recent history. Higher capital spending in the energy industry combined with increased customer activity levels in has resulted in improved results. During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier one clients which contributed to the improved operating results. Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $26,892,249 compared to $18,732,335 in the prior period, an increase of $8,159,914 or 44%. Adjusted gross margin for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $10,879,928 compared to $4,982,731 in the prior period, an increase of $5,897,197 or 118%. Adjusted EBITDA for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $8,147,223 compared to $2,959,020 in the prior period, an increase of $5,188,203 or 175%. Revenue for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $8,734,471 compared to $5,730,978 in the prior period, an increase of $3,003,493 or 52%. Adjusted gross margin for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $4,157,875 compared to $2,091,874 in the prior period, an increase of $2,066,001 or 99%. Adjusted EBITDA for the three months ended December 31, 2022, was $3,283,612 compared to adjusted EBITDA of $1,547,549 in the prior period, an increase of $1,736,063 or 112%. Increases in gross margin and EBITDA for the year and the quarter are reflective of increases customer activity in 2022 while maintaining the overall cost structure of the Company.
• For the year ended December 31, 2022, the company generated cash flow from operations of $5,910,830 compared to $3,500,869 in the prior year. This change is consistent with the higher activity during the year. The Company continues to utilize a combination of cash flow and debt to right-size and modernize its equipment fleet to meet customer demands. During the year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased $5,569,011 of capital assets primarily for natural gas power generation, upgrading the energy efficiency of existing equipment and meeting specific requests from customers. During this same period, the Company also sold property, plant and equipment and received proceeds $1,216,724 of which were re-invested in new equipment.
• During year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased and cancelled 1,799,000 shares at a cost of $714,614, or $0.40 per share. These shares had a carrying value of $1.36 per share for a total of $2,445,077 which has been removed from the share capital account. Since the initiation of the share buyback program, the Company has purchased and cancelled 10,057,500 shares at a cost of $2,391,560 or $0.24 per share. These shares have a carrying value of $1.42 per share for a total of $14,289,151 which has been removed from the share capital account over the entire share buyback program. In addition to the share buyback program, during year ended December 31, 2022, management exercised 4,881,000 options resulting in net proceeds of $901,070 being reinvested into the Company, creating a management ownership position of 40%. Enterprise has renewed its normal course issuer bid through to August 29, 2023. The Company believes its stock remains undervalued as the Company's book value is $0.68 per share. In addition, the Company has available tax losses of $0.17 per share and is in the process of developing a consolidated tax plan to utilize those losses. Management will continue to be aggressive in acquiring its shares.
• In April of this year, Enterprise Group officially launched a new wholly owned subsidiary, Evolution Power Projects, Inc. ("EPP"). EPP is the leading provider of low emission, mobile power systems and associated surface infrastructure to the Energy, Resource, and Industrial sectors. The Company's innovative methods are delivering to its client's low emission natural gas-powered systems and micro-grid technology, allowing clients to eliminate diesel entirely. A significant portion of Enterprise's capital expenditures for 2022 was for additional natural gas-powered systems, including turbine generators. EPP can now provide mobile micro-grid technology in the 1-megawatt range which has allowed EPP to expand its services into water pumping and drilling support, further eliminating the use of diesel power. Also, EPP's systems are equipped to deliver real-time emission metrics providing its clients the assurances necessary for them to accomplish their ESG reporting and objectives.
• In the prior year, the Company benefited from the Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ("CEWS" and "CERS") which ended in October 2021. To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and adjusted EBITDA to reflect the results without any subsidy programs. Utilizing the CEWS and CERS programs, the Company recorded $nil for the three months ended December 31, 2022 (2021 - $28,586) against direct costs and $nil (2021 - $31,624) against EBITDA. Utilizing the CEWS and CERS programs, the Company recorded $nil for the year ended December 31, 2022 (2021 - $1,649,087), against direct costs and $nil (2021 - $1,908,866) against EBITDA.
• After year end on January 23, 2023, the Company's common shares began trading on the OTCQB Venture Market under the ticker symbol ETOLF. In addition to the listing, Enterprise's shares are now eligible for electronic clearing and settlement with the Depository Trust Company for trading in the United States. This listing will help to increase Enterprise's visibility and accessibility to a growing audience of U.S. investors.

About Enterprise Group, Inc.
Enterprise Group, Inc is a consolidator of services-including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector. The Company works with particular emphasis on systems and technologies that mitigate, reduce, or eliminate CO2 and Greenhouse Gas emissions for itself and its clients. The Company is well known to local Tier One and international resource companies with operations in Western Canada. More information is available at the Company's website www.enterprisegrp.ca. Corporate filings can be found on www.sedar.com.
For questions or additional information, please contact:
Leonard Jaroszuk: President & CEO, or Desmond O'Kell: Senior Vice-President [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) 780-418-4400

Enterprise Group, Inc (TSX: E OTCQB: ETOLF) (the “Company” or “Enterprise”). Consolidator of energy service (including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector) emphasizes technologies that mitigate, reduce, or eliminate CO2 and Green House Gas (GHG) emissions for small local and Tier One global resource clients.
​
https://preview.redd.it/ehpnx7ght4pa1.png?width=325&format=png&auto=webp&s=f74b7fba9a246b2da6147b2de52e7e268df7e0c7
The Company’s Q4 and 2022 YoY earnings against the equivalent periods of 2021 are nothing short of exceptional. And the Company said that Q1 2023 is also shaping up to be very robust.
Audited numbers don’t lie.
Take a moment and digest these stats. If you own the shares, you should be impressed. If not, consider a second look. Once viewed, take in the Company’s very recent Letter to Shareholders detailing the impressive growth potential of the Canadian Oil and Gas industry. Enterprise is a significant source of on-site infrastructure supply and management that facilitates growth.
Here are the numbers. The comprehensive earnings can be seen in Monday morning’s comprehensive Press Release (March 20/23). The most exciting stat compares the YoY 2021 per share loss of (0.05) cents to the equivalent 2022 gain of 0.05 cents: A 200% movement of an overall 10 cents.
Enterprise shares trade at approximately CDN$0.40. For Investors and Shareholders, the Company keeps its LinkedInpage up to date with articles, videos, and commentary. Consider a Follow.
As well, the Company’s YouTube page is very informative. There will be new videos later this week.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
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https://preview.redd.it/unxtz57jt4pa1.jpg?width=1776&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=e3eb3f30241f55e8aacb41cd7098b1db1f9ab82f
(1) Identified and defined under “Non-IFRS Measures.”
(2) The Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ended in October 2021.
To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and EBITDA to reflect the results of operations without any subsidy programs.
Enterprise Group Growth Points: FY 2022
· Higher capital spending in the energy industry and increased customer activity levels have resulted in improved results. During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier-one clients, contributing to improved operating results.
· The Company believes its stock remains undervalued as the Company’s book value is $0.68 per share. In addition, the Company has available tax losses of $0.17 per share and is developing a consolidated tax plan to utilize those losses. Management will continue to be aggressive in acquiring its shares.
· During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier-one clients, contributing to improved operating results.
· During the year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased and cancelled 1,799,000 shares at $714,614, or $0.40 per share. These shares had a carrying value of $1.36 per share for $2,445,077, which has been removed from the share capital account. Since initiating the share buyback program, the Company has purchased and cancelled 10,057,500 shares at $2,391,560 or $0.24 per share.
· For the year ended December 31, 2022, the company generated cash flow from operations of $5,910,830 compared to $3,500,869 in the prior year. This change is consistent with the higher activity during the year — equipment fleet to meet customer demands.
· After year end on January 23, 2023, the Company’s common shares began trading on the OTCQB Venture Market under the ticker ETOLF. This listing will help to increase Enterprise’s visibility and accessibility to a growing audience of U.S. investors.
Bottom Line
There is the argument that Enterprise’s numbers are nothing short of extraordinary (use your own adjective). And the coming year, courtesy of increased Oil and Gas Capex spending, stellar management, and new clients with business expansion among existing, including Tier One concerns. As noted in the recent LTS:
Over one year, the Company’s share price rose 40 plus percent, from 26 to 46 cents, a new high. For comparison, S&P lost 19.4%, the Nasdaq gained 8.7%, and the Dow was down almost 9%.
​
https://preview.redd.it/91069v5lt4pa1.jpg?width=379&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=21fc21f8fde22977b29248b4e4e140b69140983c
It seems the Company is gaining horsepower, eyeballs, and growth as well as a proxy for the exceptional CAPEX growth.
Stay tuned closely, as Q1 2023 is coming.

Enterprise Group, Inc (TSX: E OTCQB: ETOLF) (the “Company” or “Enterprise”). Consolidator of energy service (including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector) emphasizes technologies that mitigate, reduce, or eliminate CO2 and Green House Gas (GHG) emissions for small local and Tier One global resource clients.
​
https://preview.redd.it/0rdncyyat4pa1.png?width=325&format=png&auto=webp&s=eabc6e2776a31210a2049f4b6a0e003b69841504
The Company’s Q4 and 2022 YoY earnings against the equivalent periods of 2021 are nothing short of exceptional. And the Company said that Q1 2023 is also shaping up to be very robust.
Audited numbers don’t lie.
Take a moment and digest these stats. If you own the shares, you should be impressed. If not, consider a second look. Once viewed, take in the Company’s very recent Letter to Shareholders detailing the impressive growth potential of the Canadian Oil and Gas industry. Enterprise is a significant source of on-site infrastructure supply and management that facilitates growth.
Here are the numbers. The comprehensive earnings can be seen in Monday morning’s comprehensive Press Release (March 20/23). The most exciting stat compares the YoY 2021 per share loss of (0.05) cents to the equivalent 2022 gain of 0.05 cents: A 200% movement of an overall 10 cents.
Enterprise shares trade at approximately CDN$0.40. For Investors and Shareholders, the Company keeps its LinkedInpage up to date with articles, videos, and commentary. Consider a Follow.
As well, the Company’s YouTube page is very informative. There will be new videos later this week.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
​
https://preview.redd.it/qrvjtghdt4pa1.jpg?width=1776&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=c528f1114735557625335fbbf124dc9079176cf4
(1) Identified and defined under “Non-IFRS Measures.”
(2) The Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ended in October 2021.
To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and EBITDA to reflect the results of operations without any subsidy programs.
Enterprise Group Growth Points: FY 2022
· Higher capital spending in the energy industry and increased customer activity levels have resulted in improved results. During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier-one clients, contributing to improved operating results.
· The Company believes its stock remains undervalued as the Company’s book value is $0.68 per share. In addition, the Company has available tax losses of $0.17 per share and is developing a consolidated tax plan to utilize those losses. Management will continue to be aggressive in acquiring its shares.
· During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier-one clients, contributing to improved operating results.
· During the year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased and cancelled 1,799,000 shares at $714,614, or $0.40 per share. These shares had a carrying value of $1.36 per share for $2,445,077, which has been removed from the share capital account. Since initiating the share buyback program, the Company has purchased and cancelled 10,057,500 shares at $2,391,560 or $0.24 per share.
· For the year ended December 31, 2022, the company generated cash flow from operations of $5,910,830 compared to $3,500,869 in the prior year. This change is consistent with the higher activity during the year — equipment fleet to meet customer demands.
· After year end on January 23, 2023, the Company’s common shares began trading on the OTCQB Venture Market under the ticker ETOLF. This listing will help to increase Enterprise’s visibility and accessibility to a growing audience of U.S. investors.
Bottom Line
There is the argument that Enterprise’s numbers are nothing short of extraordinary (use your own adjective). And the coming year, courtesy of increased Oil and Gas Capex spending, stellar management, and new clients with business expansion among existing, including Tier One concerns. As noted in the recent LTS:
Over one year, the Company’s share price rose 40 plus percent, from 26 to 46 cents, a new high. For comparison, S&P lost 19.4%, the Nasdaq gained 8.7%, and the Dow was down almost 9%.
​
https://preview.redd.it/gbepioset4pa1.jpg?width=379&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=1d8fb35d7e8231e62c36ca7219c5900b5732035c
It seems the Company is gaining horsepower, eyeballs, and growth as well as a proxy for the exceptional CAPEX growth.
Stay tuned closely, as Q1 2023 is coming.

Enterprise Group, Inc (TSX: E OTCQB: ETOLF) (the “Company” or “Enterprise”). Consolidator of energy service (including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector) emphasizes technologies that mitigate, reduce, or eliminate CO2 and Green House Gas (GHG) emissions for small local and Tier One global resource clients.
​
https://preview.redd.it/5rhpbvl0t4pa1.png?width=325&format=png&auto=webp&s=8113ed3a4ad5a07ee86dfcc986f90e298c049713
The Company’s Q4 and 2022 YoY earnings against the equivalent periods of 2021 are nothing short of exceptional. And the Company said that Q1 2023 is also shaping up to be very robust.
Audited numbers don’t lie.
Take a moment and digest these stats. If you own the shares, you should be impressed. If not, consider a second look. Once viewed, take in the Company’s very recent Letter to Shareholders detailing the impressive growth potential of the Canadian Oil and Gas industry. Enterprise is a significant source of on-site infrastructure supply and management that facilitates growth.
Here are the numbers. The comprehensive earnings can be seen in Monday morning’s comprehensive Press Release (March 20/23). The most exciting stat compares the YoY 2021 per share loss of (0.05) cents to the equivalent 2022 gain of 0.05 cents: A 200% movement of an overall 10 cents.
Enterprise shares trade at approximately CDN$0.40. For Investors and Shareholders, the Company keeps its LinkedInpage up to date with articles, videos, and commentary. Consider a Follow.
As well, the Company’s YouTube page is very informative. There will be new videos later this week.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
​
https://preview.redd.it/p018pzt1t4pa1.jpg?width=1776&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=7ba6fe4d5d45e3133f4e078d77a88697555a5dac
(1) Identified and defined under “Non-IFRS Measures.”
(2) The Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ended in October 2021.
To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and EBITDA to reflect the results of operations without any subsidy programs.
Enterprise Group Growth Points: FY 2022
· Higher capital spending in the energy industry and increased customer activity levels have resulted in improved results. During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier-one clients, contributing to improved operating results.
· The Company believes its stock remains undervalued as the Company’s book value is $0.68 per share. In addition, the Company has available tax losses of $0.17 per share and is developing a consolidated tax plan to utilize those losses. Management will continue to be aggressive in acquiring its shares.
· During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier-one clients, contributing to improved operating results.
· During the year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased and cancelled 1,799,000 shares at $714,614, or $0.40 per share. These shares had a carrying value of $1.36 per share for $2,445,077, which has been removed from the share capital account. Since initiating the share buyback program, the Company has purchased and cancelled 10,057,500 shares at $2,391,560 or $0.24 per share.
· For the year ended December 31, 2022, the company generated cash flow from operations of $5,910,830 compared to $3,500,869 in the prior year. This change is consistent with the higher activity during the year — equipment fleet to meet customer demands.
· After year end on January 23, 2023, the Company’s common shares began trading on the OTCQB Venture Market under the ticker ETOLF. This listing will help to increase Enterprise’s visibility and accessibility to a growing audience of U.S. investors.
Bottom Line
There is the argument that Enterprise’s numbers are nothing short of extraordinary (use your own adjective). And the coming year, courtesy of increased Oil and Gas Capex spending, stellar management, and new clients with business expansion among existing, including Tier One concerns. As noted in the recent LTS:
Over one year, the Company’s share price rose 40 plus percent, from 26 to 46 cents, a new high. For comparison, S&P lost 19.4%, the Nasdaq gained 8.7%, and the Dow was down almost 9%.
​
https://preview.redd.it/cq6ixh95t4pa1.jpg?width=379&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=8a1511259a255c87a67e18f29f269d4cf8a375e3
It seems the Company is gaining horsepower, eyeballs, and growth as well as a proxy for the exceptional CAPEX growth.
Stay tuned closely, as Q1 2023 is coming.

Enterprise Group, Inc (TSX: E OTCQB: ETOLF) (the “Company” or “Enterprise”). Consolidator of energy service (including specialized equipment rental to the energy/resource sector) emphasizes technologies that mitigate, reduce, or eliminate CO2 and Green House Gas (GHG) emissions for small local and Tier One global resource clients.
​
https://preview.redd.it/7dt67qwrs4pa1.png?width=325&format=png&auto=webp&s=b07beb0da842a7cb3d4411be550cf35a576d7c31
The Company’s Q4 and 2022 YoY earnings against the equivalent periods of 2021 are nothing short of exceptional. And the Company said that Q1 2023 is also shaping up to be very robust.
Audited numbers don’t lie.
Take a moment and digest these stats. If you own the shares, you should be impressed. If not, consider a second look. Once viewed, take in the Company’s very recent Letter to Shareholders detailing the impressive growth potential of the Canadian Oil and Gas industry. Enterprise is a significant source of on-site infrastructure supply and management that facilitates growth.
Here are the numbers. The comprehensive earnings can be seen in Monday morning’s comprehensive Press Release (March 20/23). The most exciting stat compares the YoY 2021 per share loss of (0.05) cents to the equivalent 2022 gain of 0.05 cents: A 200% movement of an overall 10 cents.
Enterprise shares trade at approximately CDN$0.40. For Investors and Shareholders, the Company keeps its LinkedInpage up to date with articles, videos, and commentary. Consider a Follow.
As well, the Company’s YouTube page is very informative. There will be new videos later this week.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
​
https://preview.redd.it/dmrtdfrts4pa1.jpg?width=1776&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=48dcb26cf6be8f9989b4e322b044c50672216d2e
(1) Identified and defined under “Non-IFRS Measures.”
(2) The Canadian Emergency Wage Subsidy and Rent Subsidy Programs ended in October 2021.
To provide further comparability to pre-COVID operations, the Company has presented adjusted gross margin and EBITDA to reflect the results of operations without any subsidy programs.
Enterprise Group Growth Points: FY 2022
· Higher capital spending in the energy industry and increased customer activity levels have resulted in improved results. During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier-one clients, contributing to improved operating results.
· The Company believes its stock remains undervalued as the Company’s book value is $0.68 per share. In addition, the Company has available tax losses of $0.17 per share and is developing a consolidated tax plan to utilize those losses. Management will continue to be aggressive in acquiring its shares.
· During the year, Enterprise secured additional supply and services agreements with three of its tier-one clients, contributing to improved operating results.
· During the year ended December 31, 2022, the Company purchased and cancelled 1,799,000 shares at $714,614, or $0.40 per share. These shares had a carrying value of $1.36 per share for $2,445,077, which has been removed from the share capital account. Since initiating the share buyback program, the Company has purchased and cancelled 10,057,500 shares at $2,391,560 or $0.24 per share.
· For the year ended December 31, 2022, the company generated cash flow from operations of $5,910,830 compared to $3,500,869 in the prior year. This change is consistent with the higher activity during the year — equipment fleet to meet customer demands.
· After year end on January 23, 2023, the Company’s common shares began trading on the OTCQB Venture Market under the ticker ETOLF. This listing will help to increase Enterprise’s visibility and accessibility to a growing audience of U.S. investors.
Bottom Line
There is the argument that Enterprise’s numbers are nothing short of extraordinary (use your own adjective). And the coming year, courtesy of increased Oil and Gas Capex spending, stellar management, and new clients with business expansion among existing, including Tier One concerns. As noted in the recent LTS:
Over one year, the Company’s share price rose 40 plus percent, from 26 to 46 cents, a new high. For comparison, S&P lost 19.4%, the Nasdaq gained 8.7%, and the Dow was down almost 9%.
​
https://preview.redd.it/n21jju3ys4pa1.jpg?width=379&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=7461ef24dfce9908e313917888072195ab41d0bc
It seems the Company is gaining horsepower, eyeballs, and growth as well as a proxy for the exceptional CAPEX growth.
Stay tuned closely, as Q1 2023 is coming.

With Liverpool's season effectively over at the Bernabeu, many have turned their attention towards the upcoming rebuild instead of our final push in the contention for the CL spot. Journalists, Klopp, and even the players themselves have referenced over and over again the necessity of new signings with departures rumoured if not confirmed. The signs are there for a summer overhaul of the squad; this rebuild will in all likelihood be Klopp's final attempt at building a title-challenging Liverpool.
Through writing this, I hope that I can illustrate what our rebuild should entail, what kind of players Liverpool should sign in the upcoming transfer window and several candidates that should fit this assessment. For the sake of brevity, I won't be as detailed with the stats as my Mane post, more so due to the scale of a rebuild in comparison with replacing a single player. Also, bear in mind that personally, I see most of the candidates listed here as unrealistic signings. Even if unrealistic, these players should at least paint a picture of the kind of players we should be looking at in the summer.
Having said that, let's take a look at Liverpool's current line-up and assess where we can strengthen the ageing and declining squad.

1. Assessing Liverpool’s Decline

1.1. The Academy

Let’s start with what I consider to be the club’s most important infrastructure: the academy. Our youth intake can now boast another future starter in their most recent graduate: Stefan Bajcetic; a proud moment for the academy, and a tragic one for our midfield. Aside from Bajcetic, plenty of soon-to-be academy graduates are also shaping up their game with Conor Bradley, Leighton Clarkson, Sepp van den Berg, and Tyler Morton all playing a role in their respective loans.
Stefan Bajcetic, Sepp van den Berg, Tyler Morton, Conor Bradley, and Leighton Clarkson
The current academy squad is also no slouch, with Ben Doak and Kaide Gordon leading the way well beyond their age peers. Amongst the current crop of our young talents, I also suggest taking notes on Bobby Clark, Isaac Mabaya, Luke Chambers, Melkamu Frauendorf, Oakley Cannonier, and Trent Kone-Doherty. These are talented youngsters that in all likelihood will feature in the early stages of our annual youth-driven Carabao campaign, and might be sitting on the bench should an injury crisis emerge.
All in all, a pretty healthy youth setup full of promising youngsters with room to grow.

1.2. Goalkeepers

Next are our number 1s: Alisson, Kelleher, and Adrian. With that line-up of goalkeepers, right now goalkeeping is the least of Liverpool’s worries. Alisson this season has been one of if not outright the best goalkeeper in the world, with 29 goals conceded out of a post-shot expected goal (PSxG) of 37.2. Outperforming one's PSxG can be explained by either luck or skill, and personally, I do think the latter is a more plausible explanation than the former for Ali. Other websites would illustrate this point through terms such as PSxG-GA or "goals prevented"; in Ali's case, he would have a top 5 league-leading "goals prevented" of 8.2.
Kelleher and Adrian are solid backups and unfortunately, that solidity is one reason why Liverpool should be looking at signing a backup goalkeeper. Kelleher should now have plenty of suitors seeking his services after his cup heroics. With his game time limited by the best keeper in the world, he should now be looking at other clubs as the next step in his career. While Adrian remains a solid 3rd option, his recent cameos leave much to be desired as our first backup. Of course, Harvey Davies from the academy could step up to the occasion as his predecessors had risen for the backup spot: Kelleher and Ward. A safer option though is signing a deputy goalkeeper in the case of Kelleher’s departure.

1.3. Defenders

Unlike our excellent goalkeeping situation, the players forming our backline seems to have declined significantly in terms of performance. From a title-challenging backline to conceding 3 more goals in 12 fewer games, the regression of our defence is far too steep to be justified by the midfield’s mediocrity alone. Similarly, placing our woes solely on the backline would mean missing the bigger context of what went wrong with Liverpool’s defence.
Surprisingly, certain players are actually outputting more numbers in their defensive stats this season. This can indicate either an improvement in defensive abilities or failure of defensive duties from the midfield; both are valid interpretations of the data available. Looking at the data within this context, 4 data points jump out as highlights of our declining back-line: Aerial duels along with challenges lost for Gomez, Matip, and Virgil, and carries into the final third along with dispossession for Robertson and Trent.
Long gone are the days of Matip and Virgil clattering every striker competing for long balls. In aerial duels, both are shadows of themselves compared to their title-winning season. As for challenges lost, Gomez and Matip’s erratic charts can be explained by their injury woes; what is far more concerning in my opinion is Virgil’s steady decline since 2021. What started out as scouting a replacement for Matip might end up as the search for Virgil’s successor.
A comparison of Gomez, Matip, and Virgil's aerial duels won and challenges lost in the Premier League in the last 4 years, courtesy of FBRef.com
As for Robertson and Trent, two trends are observable in their charts. The first is that our fullbacks are no longer playing as two pseudo-wingers terrorizing the opposing backline. Trent in particular seemed to have adopted a far more conservative approach in progressing the ball and occupying a deeper space behind Salah. One could argue that Henderson’s decline and a growing reluctance to cover for Trent led to this transition, but another thing to note is that the same trend can be observed with Robertson this year. It wouldn’t be unreasonable to say that currently, our fullbacks are being held back by a lack of adequate defensive cover in the midfield.
A comparison of Robertson and Trent's carries into final third and dispossessed in the Premier League in the last 4 years, courtesy of FBRef.com
The second observable trend is that our fullbacks are also losing the ball far more often than they had done in our title-winning year. Although that might sound obvious as a result of their predisposition to overlap and deliver dangerous crosses, keep in mind that our fullbacks are becoming more conservative over the years. This means that when they do lose possession, they more often than not lose it in areas closer to our goal than ever before. The lack of defensive midfielders covering for them along with our high defensive line exacerbates this conundrum of frequently conceding possession in dangerous areas.
Within this context, it comes as no surprise that Ramsay lacks Klopp’s trust whilst Milner seems to be playing more often as the deputy right back. Placing the teenager whilst opposing clubs are actively targeting his side of the pitch would be a literal baptism by fire. Milner on the other hand has the experience to stop the opposing team’s quick transition in these areas through a combination of gamesmanship and tactical fouling.
Speaking of deputies, Tsimikas’s excellent showing in cameos should now interest other clubs seeking services. Unfortunately, we now face the same situation as Kelleher with a backup option too good to happily accept a bench role. The sensible thing to do now would be to sell him off at his highest value and sign a backup left back with the potential to Robertson’s place.
All in all, a noticeable drop off in comparison to 2019/2020 for all defenders involved, and unfortunately a steep decline from Matip whose departure might be the best course of action for all parties involved. Should Virgil continue to regress further along the season, signing a successor needs to be a priority in the summer transfer window. In addition, Klopp needs to either trust Ramsay in Trent’s role or sign a new deputy right back alongside a possible replacement for Tsimikas in the summer window.

1.4. Midfielders

Anyone blessed with the gift of sight can clearly see our midfield as the biggest culprit of Liverpool’s recent misery. More specifically, the two stalwarts of Liverpool’s midfield three, Fabinho and Henderson, seem to have fallen off a cliff form-wise. Injuries to Keita, Ox, Thiago and even loanee Arthur make matters worse as Liverpool struggle to field a reliable midfield.
Taking a look at the defensive stats of our number 6s we can clearly see a decline in every facet of their defensive contributions
A comparison of Fabinho and Henderson's aerials won and dribblers tackled in the Premier League in the last 4 years, courtesy of FBRef.com
Aerial duels, ground duels, interceptions; every stat line serve as a testament to the decline we’re seeing in every match of the season. If the charts didn’t convince you that we needed an entire midfield overhaul in the summer, nothing probably could. Signing a replacement for the defensive midfielder role should be the number one priority for the next transfer window, and it probably would be if we didn’t have a circus at our number 8 positions.
A comparison of Fabinho and Henderson's interceptions and tackles in the Premier League in the last 4 years, courtesy of FBRef.com
For our box-to-box midfielders, we have Elliott and Jones who couldn’t contribute much defensively, Keita and Ox leaving in the summer, along with injuries to Arthur and Thiago. This perfect concoction of a shitshow we’re currently facing means that 18 years old Bajcetic and 37 years old Milner are somehow competing as Liverpool’s best midfielder this season; something has clearly gone terribly wrong. Reinforcements for the midfield, especially box-to-box midfielders, are paramount to the success of Liverpool’s final season with Klopp.

1.5. Forwards

Last but not least is our frontline. Thankfully, we’ve already begun the process of rebuilding our declining front line with Mane’s transfer to Bayern and Firmino set to depart at the end of the season. What we’re left with is a still very productive Salah alongside Diaz, Jota, Gakpo, and Nunez as our next generation of forwards. Fabio Carvalho and Harvey Elliott are also available as depth options, and hopefully with enough experience, as competitors for the starting spot.
The only conceivable gap in our front line seemingly stems from rumours of clubs interested in acquiring Jota’s services. Even if he had lost his starting place recently, selling Jota means that Liverpool will lose a talented forward that can cover multiple areas of the pitch. Should Jota prefer to play elsewhere with a guaranteed starting spot, Liverpool should replace him with a forward that can similarly provide tactical flexibility on the pitch. With Diaz, Gakpo, and Nunez more than capable of filling in Jota’s natural position, perhaps Liverpool should look at right-wingers available on the market instead.

2. Profiling the Traits of Liverpool’s Future Signings

As per our assessment, we need 2-3 starting midfielders, a centre-back, possible replacements for Jota, Kelleher, and Tsimikas should they depart, and a deputy for Trent should Ramsay fail to impress Klopp. Finding candidates for these roles should be an easy enough task, right? We can simply map out the ideal traits of a Klopp player, and seek out suitable talents that perform well statistically in each role. Thus, for each role we need someone with the following traits:
All: Comfortable in possession. GK: Accurate distribution, runs out to clear the ball. CB: Dominant in duels, high-volume ball progression and defensive contribution. FB: Excellent crossing, high-volume ball progression and chance creation. DM: Dominant in duels, high-volume ball progression and defensive contribution. CM: High-volume ball progression, chance creation, and defensive contribution. RW: High volume ball progression and chance creation.
Of course, these traits will filter well-performing players in the scope of their statistically observed performances. Aside from these attributes, we also need to consider several factors outside of the boundaries of each statistic such as:

2.1. Injury Record

The first priority for our new signings is simple: no reoccurring injuries that could make them unavailable in Liverpool’s gruelling schedule. We’ve all seen the games missed chart with Liverpool at the bottom, a whole quarter ahead of 19th-placed Chelsea. Permanently signing players prone to injuries would be repeating the same mistakes of our previous campaigns.
A pristine injury record is nice to have, but should not prevent us from signing quality players with the occasional unfortunate injuries. The keyword here is “occasional”; any player with an extensive injury record should still be barred from our candidate list.

2.2. Tactical Adaptability and Liverpool’s Playstyle

Another thing to note is the difference in playstyle between the candidates’ current club and Liverpool. Klopp’s system is especially rigid in practice, making it more difficult for players in clubs with little to no similarity in their tactical setup. Only 4 players have adapted perfectly to Liverpool’s system the moment they play under Klopp: Alisson, Firmino, Salah, and Virgil; three of them are undoubtedly world-class, while the other is a literal incarnation of the system itself.
Of course, that doesn’t mean that players in terrorist-adjacent clubs should be barred entirely. Instead, players who should be more familiar with Klopp’s system are given preference over their similarly well-performing counterparts.

2.3. Preferred Traits vs. Performance-Oriented Traits

This leads us to another facet of Klopp’s system, the requirement of very specific traits in each positional roles. This can lead to identifying players who performed well in their current roles but are unsuitable for Liverpool. Conversely, this can also lead to missing out on players who could perform well in our setup but are limited to their current unsuitable role.
Let’s look at goalkeepers as an example, on one hand, we require a keeper with a good distribution that plays comfortably in a high defensive line. On the other hand, limiting our candidate pool to players with these traits can lead to missing out on excellent goalkeepers who are unable to display said trait in their club’s tactical setup.
A balanced approach then should consider this collective vs. individual facet of a player. A well-performing candidate should still be considered even if they’re playing in an unsuitable setup. The priority of course remains to seek out suitable traits in our candidates, but exceptions need to be made in the context of a candidate’s performances collectively vis-à-vis individually.

2.4. Difficulties in Acquiring Players

Last is the sale availability of the players themselves. Liverpool is a historic institution competing against Europe’s most prestigious clubs, but that doesn’t mean acquiring players is a straightforward task. The most oft-told factor is CL spots and while that may be a hindrance in signing certain players, internal club policy dictates that such candidates are eliminated early on. A bigger problem for Liverpool is actually how talented the current players are.
Think for a second that you’re an up-and-coming young player negotiating with Liverpool and other clubs. Your inner fan would obviously accept Liverpool’s offer, but existing players could ensure that your time at Anfield is spent more on the bench rather than the field. If you’re a goalkeeper, are you sure you want to sign with a club with the world’s best in your spot? Or as a right back, can you compete with the most creative player of his generation for game time?
Of course, this doesn’t mean that we should limit ourselves to academy graduates and players comfortable on the bench as our backups. Instead, a smarter look at clubs beneath our stature should guarantee more willingness for players to sign for us. For the average top 5 league starting goalkeeper, signing for Liverpool means a drastic reduction of on-field actions. For the same starting goalkeeper recently relegated? The bench at Liverpool might be a more attractive career trajectory even with limited game time.

3. Candidates

3.1. Goalkeeper

For our goalkeepers, I limited myself to clubs either well below our stature or likely to be relegated to increase the sensibility of the transfer. Although they’re playing in inferior teams, that does not necessarily translate to being bad goalkeepers themselves. One, in particular, is even leading La Liga in PSxG-GA, though unfortunately, an excellent goalkeeper can only do as much as his teammates allow him to.
Edgar Badia, Gavin Bazunu, Marco Carnesecchi, Emil Audero, and Paul Bernardoni
Edgar Badia. 31. Elche
The first candidate is unironically the worst fit for Liverpool. With a reluctance for rushing out attackers and a similar age profile to Alisson, he is nowhere near the ideal solution for the GK spot. Why is he my first choice you ask? Well, his PSxG-GA figure of 7.0 is top of the charts in La Liga and 3rd in the top 5 European leagues. Additionally, his 3 penalties saved and relatively accurate long pass completion percentage of 45.1% make him an attractive addition to the team.
Gavin Bazunu. 21. Southampton Marco Carnesecchi. 22. Atalanta, on loan at Cremonese
The next two candidates all fit the criteria with asterisks beside their names. In particular, Bazunu PSxG-GA leaves a lot to be desired while Carnesecchi's reluctance to rush out might not fit Liverpool’s high line. What both have in common however is a high ceiling for growth and the occasional moments of brilliance common in rough and unpolished goalkeeping gems. Some highlights include their respective matches against Manchester United and Bologna. Under Alisson’s tutelage (and Taffarel's to boot!), both could very well develop into worthy competition for the starting spot.
Emil Audero. 26. Sampdoria Paul Bernardoni. 25. Angers
Audero and Bernardoni are in ways very similar to Bazunu and Carnesecchi. Like Carnesecchi, Audero’s lack of defensive actions outside the penalty area may limit Liverpool’s high line. Bernardoni is also very similar to Bazunu with a below-standard PSxG-GA and excellent rushing-out numbers. Although the two are inferior in ceiling and statistics wise, both are still performing at an acceptable level for the role of Liverpool’s bench option. In addition, goalkeepers mature differently from other football positions. They might show improvements well into the years to come should they sign for Liverpool.

3.2. Centre Back

For our centre-back position, we need players who can progress the ball as well as Matip without sacrificing any sense of defensive acumen and solidity. As mentioned previously, dominance in aerial duels would be a huge bonus for our candidates due to Virgil’s slight decline and Matip’s fallen form in these stats.
Kim Min-Jae, Edson Alvarez, Ko Itakura, Goncalo Inacio, and Kevin Danso
Kim Min-Jae. 26. Napoli
The monster himself needs no introduction. Helming the defence of the Scudetto’s leading contender, the former Fenerbahce defender established himself amongst Europe’s greatest centre-backs after a successful debut season for Napoli. His presence in this list is for one sole reason: the reports of a vastly undervalued release clause in his Napoli contract. Even if his actual fee were to be higher than reported, Liverpool should do everything in its power to recruit what could very well be Virgil’s replacement when the opportunity presents itself.
Edson Alvarez. 25. Ajax Ko Itakura. 26. Monchengladbach
Edson Alvarez and Ko Itakura are amongst the best ball-playing centre-backs playing right now. What they lack in traditional defensive stats such as clearances and interceptions they more than make up for in other areas more related to Liverpool’s possession-heavy setup. With 88.1% and 91.3% pass completion rates and averaging 78.2 and 72.62 passes attempted per 90, they can without a doubt replicate Matip’s excellent ball distribution.
The similarities to Matip don’t end there. Averaging 1.75 and 1.1 progressive carries per 90 alongside 0.7 and 0.41 successful take-ons per 90, Alvarez and Itakura are more than capable of executing Matip’s signature run. In addition, both of them excel at different areas lacking in Matip’s game. For Alvarez? A tackling rate of 3.04 per 90 compared to Matip’s 1.78. For Itakura? A blocking rate of 1.92 per 90 compared to Matip’s 0.53. As a cherry on top, both are also very capable of playing in the number 6 role should another midfield crisis emerge.
Though the stats do indicate Alvarez as a better player, both would be a very welcome addition to the club.
Goncalo Inacio. 21. Sporting Kevin Danso. 24. Lens
Goncalo Inacio and Kevin Danso are more traditional centre-backs compared to Alvarez and Itakura, but incompetent in possession they are not. They may lack the tactical flexibility provided by the two aforementioned candidates, but what they can provide is excellent ball distribution and the potential of a higher ceiling over the years.
Inacio’s better stats overall, left-footedness, and younger age edge him out as my preference out of the two.

3.3. Right Back

Trent’s age makes finding a deputy for him a bit awkward as good senior right-backs wouldn’t want to join in as a bench option, while promising right-backs are almost all at his age bracket. The options then are either younger players with the potential to usurp his position or seasoned players outside of the Champions League.
Vanderson, Jonathan Clauss, Przemyslaw Frankowski, Yukinari Sugawara, and Arnau Martinez
Vanderson. 21. Monaco
A promising full-back perfecting his trade in Ligue 1, Vanderson is a future star in the making. At 21 years old, his stats far exceed his age peers, excelling in progressive passes, take-ons, tackles, interceptions, and blocks. Investing in Vanderson at this stage of Trent’s career would either mean a transition in his position to midfield a la Kimmich, or the best modern right-back pairing in Liverpool’s history.
Jonathan Clauss. 30. Marseille Przemyslaw Frankowski. 27. Lens
Jonathan Clauss and Przemyslaw Frankowski would need some convincing to come to Liverpool, but the effort would be worthwhile should Trent’s form continue to decline. Both players’ origin as wingers in the early days of their careers would suit Liverpool’s playstyle to a tee with the numbers to back them up. The gung-ho nature of our fullbacks, marauding in every transition would see both players flourish under Klopp’s instructions.
Yukinari Sugawara. 22. AZ Alkmaar Arnau Martinez. 19. Girona
Yukinari Sugawara and Arnau Martinez fulfil very contrasting roles at a similar age bracket; and as different as they are, what they’re offering as a rotation option would fill in gaps in Liverpool’s line-up all the same. Sugawara is a right-back shifted from the right-sided midfield position while Martinez is a right-back shifted from the centre-back position, and as a consequence, signing either of them would fill another gap in each respective natural position.
Tactical flexibility isn’t the only reason to sign either of them, both are also very productive numbers-wise. Sugawara is a very good attacking right back with 3 goals, 6 assists, and 10 goal-creating actions in the league to his name. The same can be said with Martinez, who although isn’t as offensively influential as Sugawara, can still produce 2 goals, 2 assists, and 4 goal-creating actions to his name. Conversely, Sugawara lags behind defensively while Martinez is ahead of him in all defensive stats.
Though the two would be astute signings, Sugawara’s offensive productivity alongside a possible role as Salah’s deputy edges him out of the two.

3.4. Left Back

Assuming Tsimikas’s departure, a similarly high-output backup for Robertson is essential for two key reasons. One is that in my opinion, the Greek Scouser breathing down Robbo’s neck is an essential part of why he is still one of the world’s best in his position. Another is that Robertson’s age should start slowing him down sooner or later, replacing Tsimikas with an equally talented replacement would ensure a continuity of excellence in our left-back position.
Jose Gaya, David Raum, Adrien Truffert, and Quentin Merlin
Jose Gaya. 27. Valencia
Why on earth is he still playing for Peter Lim’s Valencia? No explanation is needed for Gaya as he remains one of the best left-backs in the world, despite playing for a self-sabotaging owner. Should Valencia be relegated this season, Liverpool would be foolish to not even consider signing him up.
David Raum. 24. RB Leipzig Caio Henrique. 25. Monaco
David Raum and Caio Henrique are two very good attacking left-backs who might even be an upgrade over Tsimikas. Though, by the same logic, acquiring either of them would cost Liverpool a significant amount of capital for a position we’re quite happy with at the present. Although Henrique’s numbers are superior to Raum's, the underlying stats do show the former to be more consistent in creating chances for his teammates. Raum’s higher numbers in defensive stats edge him out as my personal preference between the two.
Adrien Truffert. 21. Rennes Quentin Merlin. 20. Nantes
Adrien Truffert and Quentin Merlin are two promising left-backs currently playing their trade in Ligue 1. Although still very young, both are producing respectable numbers for a full-back, especially at their age bracket. The two will probably sign for another club before blossoming into higher-calibre players, as is the case with Robertson in Hull. Accordingly, a case could be made to sign either one of them as Robertson’s French protégé. Truffert’s higher numbers in both assists and defensive stats lead me to favour him at the early stages of their careers.

3.5. Anchor Midfielder

Due to Klopp’s tendency to play a pseudo-back three in possession, the candidates for our number 6 role need to possess similar attributes to our centre-back candidates. Unfortunately, due to the defensive nature of the role, stats used to gauge a player’s ability in possession such as passes attempted, pass completion rate, progressive carries, and progressive passes are all rendered unreliable with plenty of clubs happy to see their number 6 sitting back for the duration of the game. Liverpool though does need to have these traits in our defensive midfielder, so candidates possessing them would gain an advantage over players in more counter-attacking teams.
Declan Rice, Joao Palhinha, Manuel Locatelli, Manuel Ugarte, and Florentino Luis
Declan Rice. 24. West Ham
England stalwart Declan Rice is one of if not the most sought-after players for his position, and with good reasons too. With an excellent eye for interceptions and a terrific success rate for duels won, he would bring comfort and stability wherever he goes. Possession-wise, he is also the leading contender, high volume of passes, an excellent pass completion rate, and very good numbers in ball progression. Overall, the perfect player to fit in the number 6 role.
Joao Palhinha. 27. Fulham Manuel Locatelli. 25. Juventus
With competition to Rice’s signature and his homegrown status driving up his price. Joao Palhinha and Manuel Locatelli are more than capable of emulating what he could achieve at Liverpool. Defensively they perform at a similar level to Rice, and in some aspects are even better suited to Liverpool’s playstyle. An argument can be made for Palhinha as the best in the world in terms of duels, as he is leading the top 5 European leagues in tackles whilst offering higher aerial duels and clearance numbers than Rice. Locatelli is no slouch either, achieving higher numbers than Rice in all defensive stats barring interceptions.
Palhinha’s higher numbers in duels make him the clear choice between the two, though, Locatelli’s much better possession stats do indicate him as the better fit for Liverpool.
Manuel Ugarte. 21. Sporting Florentino Luis. 23. Benfica
Florentino Luis and Manuel Ugarte are far from being the best at their position, however, they should be a wiser long-term investment than the other candidates. The two play a key role in their respective Portuguese clubs, demonstrating excellence at a young age week in and week out. With elite defensive numbers in duels and interceptions, Luis and Ugarte are both without question excellent defensive midfielders only a big transfer away from worldwide recognition.
Albeit inferior to Luis in terms of his ability in the air and with the ball, Ugarte’s younger age profile makes him my preferred choice out of the two.

3.6. Box-to-Box Midfielder

As the main engine of the team, our midfield candidates should be able to progress the ball well while maintaining a high defensive output in part due to Liverpool’s tactical set-up. While Liverpool’s system means that high creative output isn’t vital for our candidates, they should nevertheless be involved in the build-up and transitional phases of a game, whether through progressive passes, progressive carries or taking on opposing players directly.
Jude Bellingham, Mikel Merino, Ismael Bennacer, Manu Kone, and Enzo Le Fee
Jude Bellingham. 19. Dortmund
Currently one of if not outright the best in his position, simple as.
Mikel Merino. 26. Real Sociedad Ismael Bennacer. 25. Milan
Mikel Merino and Ismael Bennacer both fit the bill well for the number 8 role in Klopp’s midfield three. Should either one of them sign for Liverpool, they would add a defensive integrity solely lacking due to Fabinho and Henderson’s decline. Both also offer different defensive traits to their midfield; Merino is excellent in aerial duels and clearance, while Bennacer is better at ground duels and interceptions.
Merino’s dominance in the air edges him out as my preferred choice between the two players.
Manu Kone. 21. Monchengladbach Enzo Le Fee. 23. Lorient
Manu Kone and Enzo Le Fee might cost the least in this category, but acquiring either of them would significantly strengthen Liverpool’s midfield. As are the candidates before them, Kone and Le Fee excel in ball progression. Both are elite in taking on opposing players, with Kone and Le Fee placing in the 99th and 96th percentile in terms of successful take-ons across all midfielders in the top 5 leagues. Similarly, both maintain a good rate of progressive carries and passes, with Le Fee in particular performing at an elite level in terms of carries.
Defensively, they’re no slouch either. Kone and Le Fee are producing more than-average numbers in blocks and interceptions, and very good numbers in tackles. Le Fee’s lack of physical stature seems to not be a hindrance, as his 3.29 rate of tackles per 90 places him in the 95th percentile in terms of tackles. All in all, two very good midfielders who would fit perfectly in Klopp’s midfield three.

3.6.1. Playmaker Midfielder?

Liverpool has been rumoured to sign Mason Mount for months and honestly, the thought of him in the squad throws a wrench into my original draft. Initially, I thought that Liverpool needed at least 2 starting box-to-box midfielders to fill in our upcoming departures. Mount though can fill in for this gap alongside other offensive roles should another injury crisis emerge at Anfield. Should he choose to stay at Chelsea, Liverpool can either pursue another no. 8 or an alternative flexible playmaker instead. This section is written with the assumption of the latter, rather than the former.
Mason Mount, Daichi Kamada, Brais Mendez, Lovro Majer, and Aleksandr Golovin
Mason Mount. 24. Chelsea
The team had been linked to numerous playmakers over the years, notably, the consistent Brandt and Gotze rumours before Mane and Salah’s meteoric rise. However, their arrivals see them either adapt as a number 8 (Wijnaldum), play on the wings (Carvalho), or even side-lined entirely to cup games (Minamino). Whichever the case may be for Mount, his brief time in the Premier League shows an excellent hardworking playmaker with the bonus of fulfilling our home-grown quota.
Daichi Kamada. 26. Eintracht Frankfurt Brais Mendez. 26. Real Sociedad
Daichi Kamada and Brais Mendez are both more than adequate alternatives to Mason Mount. Similarly, both play a creative role behind a striker, either centrally or as an inside-winger. Output wise they are currently amongst Europe’s most productive playmakers, with both contributing 7 goals alongside 4 and 3 assists in their respective league.
The two high-pressing playmakers are also more than capable of contributing defensively, with Kamada in particular performing well enough to be placed at the 90th percentile for tackles + interceptions across all midfielders in the top 5 European leagues. His tenacity to win the ball back edges him out between the two as my preferred choice.
Lovro Majer. 25. Rennes Aleksandr Golovin. 26. Monaco
The last candidates for a possible new role in Liverpool’s line-up are Lovro Majer and Aleksandr Golovin. Like Kamada and Mendez, both are creative playmakers with a willingness to press, tackle, and be the first line of their team’s defence. The two players though differ in what they could offer tactically. Lovro Majer’s higher numbers in passing completion, passing volume, progressive passes, and take-ons could see him shift to more of an attacking number 8. Golovin meanwhile with his much higher creative output could play as a deputy for the wingers.

3.7. Right Winger

With Jota rumoured to leave and Klopp refusing to start Elliott in his natural position, a gap remains dormant in Liverpool’s right wing. Candidates should have a respectable creative output, and a consistent ability to progress the ball higher up the field. Additionally, successful take-ons should be a high priority for the candidates. After all, with Sadio Mane’s departure, Luis Diaz is the only remaining player in Liverpool’s frontline with the ability to consistently beat his marker.
Moussa Diaby, David Neres, Marco Asensio, and Tete
Moussa Diaby. 23. Leverkusen David Neres. 27. Napoli
The first two candidates are Leverkusen’s Moussa Diaby and David Neres, both very good players with all the characteristics required for a winger. Attacking output? Check. Diaby’s 8 goals and 4 assists along with Neres’ 6 goals and 5 assists paint a picture of two very productive wingers. Ball progression? Check. Neres’ progressive carries, passes, and take-ons are amongst the best in his league, while Diaby’s progressive carries make up for his average passes and take-ons figures. The only missing part of their game is a lack of respectable defensive numbers, something fixable with enough sessions at Kirkby.
The age profile, numbers, and a harder league to play in making it a clear choice for Diaby. Even so, Neres would be an astute second choice should the cost of acquiring Diaby be too prohibitive.
Marco Asensio. 27. Real Madrid
A class creative playmaker available out of contract; to hell with Marco Asensio’s take-ons stats, refusing to sign a player of his calibre for free is a fool’s errand.
Tete. 23. Lyon, on loan at Leicester City Vaclav Cerny. 25. Twente
While the three wingers mentioned above are all very good in terms of performance, Tete and Vaclav Cerny are excellent in the sense that both are the perfect wingers for Liverpool. In terms of output, both are having the season of their life with 7 goals and 2 assists for Tete, and 9 goals and 4 assists for Cerny. In addition, both are also very good at beating their man with a successful take-on rate of 2.25 and 2.6 per 90. What makes them perfect for Liverpool however is their willingness to win the ball back out of possession. Amongst Liverpool’s frontline, our false 9s Jota and Gakpo are the only ones with comparable defensive figures.

4. Conclusion

At the minimum, Liverpool needs 3-4 signings to remain competitive in Europe. That amount though is an optimistic estimate that implies a return in form for the rest of the squad. Conversely, we are looking at 7-8 signings in the very worst-case scenario of further regressing performances and rumoured departures. Both sit at the extreme end of each side, and realistically speaking we should expect the real amount to be closer to the lower estimate.
Of the highest priority is signing 2-3 starting midfielders to address upcoming departures, and more importantly, the decline of Fabinho and Henderson. Reverting to Klopp’s double pivot is also a possibility with Firmino set to depart in the summer. Replacing Matip with a quality centre-back should also be a priority if Gomez and Virgil were to regress further along the season.
If Jota, Kelleher, and Tsimikas’s rumoured departures turn out to be true, we also need to replace them with adequate rotation options in each respective role. The last possible signing is fully dependent on Ramsay’s future. Once recovered from his injury, will Klopp trust him enough to bench Trent?. Should the answer be untrue, offloading him and acquiring another right back is the sensible thing to do.
The candidates I found most attractive are Declan Rice, Jude Bellingham, Kim Min-Jae, and Mason Mount. These are elite players that will not only transform Liverpool’s fortunes but also take shape as Klopp’s Liverpool legacy the same way Shankly’s 1972 rebuild had in footballing history. Of course, more sensible options are also available as well in these areas. Even then, the focus of the rebuild should still be acquiring and fielding the most talented players in these roles. Of lesser importance to Liverpool’s glory are the rotation options for the goalkeeper, right back, left back, and right winger spots. For these positions, Marco Carnesecchi, Yukinari Sugawara, Adrien Truffert, and Tete are all examples of sensible signings for each respective role without breaking the bank.
Credits to FBref.com and Opta as the main source of the stats, Transfermarkt as a source for candidates’ injury records and transfer estimates, and Excel for refusing to print my radar diagrams you useless anti-trust software. A big thank you to Opta especially as they finally added back progressive carries to Fbref.com the tight bastards.
Lastly, I began writing this article 2 weeks before posting it here. If there are any statistical errors or listed players who signed for other clubs since the time of writing, all I can say is ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.
TL; DR: Declan Rice, Jude Bellingham, Kim Min-Jae, and Mason Mount. Skim along the article for suitable alternatives and candidates in other less urgent areas of the squad.